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This article aims to give an overview of the analytical approaches to political economy of
Central Asia. It argues that twenty years after transition paradigm we still ﬁnd lingering
separation between politics and economics that compartmentalizes studies of economic
development, nation- and state-building into separate projects.1 The analytical separation
between economics and politics creates two crucial problems for scholars of development in
Central Asia: the suspense of theorization of economy and lack of attention to the new
practices of governing.
Two theories tried to solve the issue of separation. First is the theory of the “resource curse”,
which argues for the inability of a raw material supplier to develop a healthy democratic
system (Pomfret, 2006; Auty, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). The second view, “varieties of capi-
talism” traces institutional and historical peculiarities as preconditions for a stable market-
oriented democratic system (Lane, 2006; Luong, 2000). However, the ﬁrst view is rather
deterministic in relying on a single variable to prove the case; whereas, the second view is
highly arbitrary by picking speciﬁc historical and cultural contexts that suit the case.
I argue that post-structuralist approaches and speciﬁcally, the framework of “gov-
ernmentality” – a term coined by Michel Foucault, allows for more fruitful heuristic
exercise. Governmentality as an analytical approach looks at the way the state positions
itself in its society and determines the type of governing rationale it adopts. Particularly, it
incorporates both discursive and structural-technological conditions of each state into
analysis by augmenting the data before constructing the theory to argue what rationale
drives government activities in the state. Governmentality speaks to both “resource curse”
and the “varieties of capitalism” by enriching and complicating them while allowing
identiﬁcation of how rationales of governing evolve and change over time.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.nd Frank Fischer for
to write this article.
Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanya1. Introduction
The question of the relationship between economics and
politics puzzled numerous scholars around the world.
Modernization literatureof the1950sand1960sshared,what
Seymour Martin Lipset called ‘optimistic equation’, i.e., that
economic development can lead to democratization (Lipset,
1963). It examined regimes and the conditions of democra-
tization (Lipset, 1959, Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1968;
Huntington, 1971; de Schweinitz 1964) rather thanng University. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.
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instead. Since then many critics dispelled the equation by
complicating and enriching it with not-so-straightforward
paths towards democracy (Moore, 1993; Schedler, 2006;
Zakaria, 2003). Despite the disputed nature of the equation,
democracy remains to be analyzed outside of economic
structures, which is reﬂected in the transition paradigm –
a ‘come-back’ of the modernization theory. Popular in the
1990s it was ﬁlled with high hopes for turning one-sixth of
the world into democratic and capitalist states after 70 years
of theSoviet burden.However, equation failed inCentralAsia.
TwoCentral Asian states remained verbose about the goals of
democracy and capitalism, but in practice established
authoritarian regimes with strong patronage networks
although more liberal domestic markets. Until recently,
transition theorists did not know what theoretical concepts
to apply for the states like that. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan,
two representative cases for the analysis in this essay, were
called pseudodemocracies, preemptive authoritarianism,
hybrid regimes and illiberal democracies (Brooker, 2009;
Diamond, 2002; Silitski, 2009) concentrating yet again on
the codiﬁcation of political regimes. According to such anal-
yses, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are authoritarian states co-
opted by the two former Soviet apparatchiks that have
remained inpower for the past 20 years. The puzzling nature
of the regimes listed together with Russia, China, and
Azerbaijan made scholars concede to the sustainability of
the authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet states
(Bermeo, 1990; Carothers, 2002; Schedler, The Menu of
Manipulation, 2002) without coherent explanations in
place. Although highly personalist and unsustainable in the
long run, thesestates representaviableoptionofgovernment
regulation. Under such conditions, both states face ‘authori-
tarian paradox’ – a situation when democracy could only be
built by the authoritarianmeans. Some blame the leaders for
stalling the political process (Kasparov, 2009; Shevtsova,
2009), others blame weak civil society (Bunce, 2003) and
culture (Liu, 2005, pp. 225–237), still others fault bureau-
cracies and the legacy of Soviet institutions and practices
(Luong, 2004) for retaining a functioning authoritarian
regime for so long. For these scholars, economic platforms of
two regimes are of little importance and are seen instru-
mentally, as an ideology or propaganda. Scholars who
concentrate on studying political regimes are unable to
explain fully why particular economic goals come about and
what the outcomes of these economic doctrines are.
However, the article ponders on the question of how two
Central Asian leaders remained in power for so long without
broad popular support and/or wide and popular resistance?
This article argues that it is impossible to trace political
implications of the regimes in Central Asia without incor-
porating economic aspects. It also claims that economic
structures facilitate several political outcomes. First, reliance
on mineral, as in the case of Kazakhstan, or cotton produc-
tion, as inUzbekistan forces states to dealwith various actors
whobring themost revenue into thebudget. These actors are
interested in the stability of the regimes, because they
beneﬁt from it. The merger of economic and political actors
creates patronage networks between business and bureau-
cracies that prevents political accountability of Central Asian
governments to its population. In addition, the overalleconomic system is structured so that people’s revenues
directly depend on the sustainability of the existing
economic systemwith other facets of economic activity being
penalized or discouraged.
The ‘Resource Curse’ (RC) literature explains political
outcomes of the merger between businesses and bureau-
cracies, whereas ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (VoC) literature
illustrates mechanisms behind the second outcome of how
economic incentives operate within political realm.
Informed largely by the Schumpeterian perspective on the
importance of ﬁscal sociology, two theories accept the
assumption that state funded by the collection of taxes is
fundamentally different in the ways governing is organized
(Moore, 2004, p. 298). Tax state threatenedby the tax-payers
bargaining abilities forms a ﬁscal social contract that
provides more representation and accountability of the
state (Moore, 2004, p. 303). Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
derive relatively small portion of their income from tax.
Instead, they accumulate their revenue from exporting
commodities abroad, which they redistribute among
patronage networks and bureaucracy (see below). As
a result of the predatory state intervention, according toVoC
literature (Libman, 2008; Luong, 2000; Hollingsworth and
Boyer, 1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001), establishment of
amarket-oriented democratic system is difﬁcult, because of
the absence of publically accountable political institutions.
RC literature adds that the rawmaterial suppliers are unable
to develop a healthy democratic system because of the
short-term economic incentives society gets from
commodity exports (Auty, 2006c; Esanov, Raiserm & Buiter,
2006; Pomfret, 2006). Two theories are illuminating for the
analysis of Central Asia becauseVoC explainswhypredatory
regulation is adopted, and the RC theory explains the results
of the regulation in both states. Although highly useful, I
argue that the second view is rather deterministic in relying
on a single variable to prove the case;whereas, theﬁrst view
is highly arbitrary by picking speciﬁc historical and cultural
contexts that suit the case. In otherwords, VoC is aversion of
historical path-dependent argument that has trouble
explaining changes, like adoption of new policies and
alteration of the old practices. On the other hand, RC liter-
ature is a version of the interest-based argument which
allows one to examine entrenched interests, but does not
explain how actors change perceptions and overcome
disagreements. In addition, both theories cannot provide an
examination of mismatch between regulation and its
implementation in practice, whereas policies are aborted or
altered when practical implementation remains difﬁcult.
Foucault’s perspective allows one to adopt a coherent
framework of analysis that would add to interest-based and
history-based explanations enriching them with the
understanding of economic regulation and power politics.
After evaluating the impact of economic structure on the
political process, this paper will focus on the rationale of
governance – a certain body of knowledge that informs
government’s attitude towards its subjects and resolution
of social problems. At the same time the rationale of
governance, or governmentality, points to how the state
perceives itself in society, the role it chooses to play.
Fundamentally, it approaches the study of political
economy by looking at how the state perceives the utility of
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rationalize reality for better ends (Foucault, 2008, 2).
Hence, governmentality points to the ‘how’ of governing, i.e
the rationales political regimes choose to reach socially
acceptable goals. I deﬁne governmental rationale as a set of
assumptions and ideas about the role of the state in society
that informs government programs and responses to social
problems. It serves as an internal logic of the state that
determines the scope and scale of government regulation.
Governmental rationale is an Ethos, a path for reaching the
ultimate goal set up by the authoritarian leaders, which I
call the telos. Telos is a meta-discourse that sets up general
goals regimes want to achieve, and ethos that informs how
to solve particular issues in practice in a way that reaches
towards the telos (Dean, 1999, 33). Governing power and
legitimacy of government regulation is provided through
discourse coordination between government bodies and
also through communication of regulation to the public
that justiﬁes the reasons of adopting proposed policies.
Foucauldian perspective that I am introducing here links
three crucial ideas: regulation and democracy in the
following way. First, it takes for granted the fact that both
regimes recognize ‘authoritarian paradox’: both leaders
share the same goal of becoming a democratic state with
the developed market economy (Karimov, 2007;
Nazarbaev, 2005), however the way to achieve this goal is
different in each regime. Second, I argue that Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan adopted two different governing rationales
(two Ethos)2. Uzbekistan positions itself as a paternalistic
statewith large involvement of the state into society. Under
such condition, legitimacy of the paternalistic ethos is
provided by a social contract that promises economic
security in exchange for political support. Discursive
strategy of the state is based on the idea that the state is
a moral entity that takes care of its citizens and the country
in general against the brutalizing forces of free market that
create inequality and lead to social problems. Instead,
Uzbekistan frames its regulation as a defense of the pop-
ulation from social evils while promising to slowly adopt
market mechanisms. Democracy is portrayed negatively at
the present due to its inability to cope with inequality.
Kazakhstan, on the other hand, sees regulation as
a technocrat. In other words, government’s role is not to
interfere into society, but instead to provide the right
incentives to social actors so that the system remains
stable. Such internal logic makes a profound difference
with Uzbekistan. Instead of arguing from the moral
perspective, Kazakhstani government perceives governing
as science, a technique. Government claims to know how
to run the system as a good manager. Such managerial
ethos exhibits legitimacy in the following fashion. If the
government claims to be knowledgeable, then it can stay
in power as long as it does what it claims to do and as long
as the systemworks. Discursive strategy of the state warns
that that change of leadership will bring instability
threatening people’s fortunes and beneﬁts, which makes
democracy a dangerous pursuit. In short, both regimes
make people dependent on the economic system they’ve2 I have made similar arguments in Adams and Rustemova 2009.created either through patrimonial networks or via state-
ownership of the majority of enterprises deriving their
legitimacy from the promise of economic beneﬁts in
exchange for political authority. Both regimes claim that
democracy is inappropriate as of today because it is unable
to cope with inequality (Uzbekistan) and instability
(Kazakhstan) reﬂecting governing rationales of each
Central Asian state.
Some political theorists might object to the use of
Foucault outside of his method, the archaeology of
knowledge and outside of liberal democracies (Rose, 1996,
1999), however, I still believe it is possible to study the
present using his distinctions of the discursive practices
but also grounding it in the economic structures. I also
argue that Foucault’s perspective is incomplete on its own
without depiction of the actual practices of regulation,
which are explained and supplied by the VoC and RC
literature. Governmentality points to the logic and the way
regulation is framed to legitimize state policies, but not
the actual state policies themselves. However, without
Foucault two theories suffer from the lack of theorization
of economy because they make assumption about its
unchanging nature as either rentier states3 or politically
authoritarian but economically liberal production regimes.
This article will, ﬁrst, outline interest-based and
historical-based perspectives in order to depict their ‘story
of Central Asia’ and then point to major drawbacks in those
stories. After that, I will propose a heuristic approach of
governmentality. Although, it may not shed a new light on
what we already know, nonetheless, it will help us to
complicate current theories of development and democ-
ratization by seeing the scope of interdependence between
economic and political realms.
2. Impact of economic structures on the political
Political economy of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan sets
a challenge to the existing theories.Ononehand, twoCentral
Asian states claim to be developing market economies and
democratic societies, on the other, they have been ruled by
the same former Communist apparatchiks for the past 20
years with the strong personalist grip on power and state
intervention in economic realm. In addition, they are and
were predominantly resource-based economies. Two theo-
ries attempted to provide explanations for these regimes
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature and Resource Curse.
VoC argued that two states have adopted different paths of
transition in the beginningof the 1990s and theyexistwithin
the bounds of these decisions still ripping the beneﬁts and
limitations. Whereas Resource Curse claims that the differ-
ences are attributed to economic and political interests over
mineral and agricultural rents. Although each paradigm has
overlapping dimensions and academic works that utilize
both, we can nonetheless discern the basic assumptions and
propositions of each. In other words, this section will try to
re-create an ‘ideal type’ of each paradigm inorder to propose
alternative scholarly practice.3 Rentier State is a state derives a large fraction of their revenue from
external rents. Please see (Ross, 2001).
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‘Resource curse’ (RC) is a term that points to thedangerof
economic growth that is reversely correlated with mineral
wealth in raw material exporting countries (Sachs and
Warner, 1995). Once the resources run out, the growth
stops. Resource Curse model provides an explanation of the
undemocratic nature of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan by
examining its economic structure. It claims that authori-
tarianism is supported by rents – a surplus that government
gets from regulating the sale of mineral and agricultural
goods in taxes and/or control of state-owned enterprises.4
Production of raw material supplies inherited from the
Soviet Union left Central Asian regimes with the abundance
of natural resources, which allowed two political regimes to
collect rents from exporting them into the world market,
rather than collecting taxes from the population thereby
being accountable to it (Tsalik, 2003). At the same time,
revenue from rents allows the regimes to buy political
support by redistributing resources among the networks of
bureaucracy and afﬁliated businesses (Tsalik, 2003). Under
such conditions, resource-abundance generates predatory
states where change of leadership through a democratic
procedure might impede chances for personal enrichment
of the majority of population (Auty, 2006b, p. 57).Economic effects of the resource curse Political effects of the resource curse
Factor-movement effect ¼ reallocation
of factors of production such as capital and
labor from other activities to resource extraction
Taxation effect ¼ low taxation of population ¼ boost
of support and no pressure for political representation ¼ >Spending
effect ¼ spending on patronage ¼ >no need for democratization
because people beneﬁt from the redistribution of the system þ Group
formation effect ¼ state blocks groups that may claim political rights
by using oil revenues to depoliticize population (Ross, 2001, pp. 332–335).
Spending effect ¼ increased aggregate demand
created by resource receipts,
Repression effect ¼ oil-rich countries spend oil revenues on a police-state
because a) oil exacerbates ethnic and other tensions and b) because
elites want to stay in power due to high rents (Ibid).
Spillover-loss effect ¼ the loss of positive
externalities associated with the (crowded out)
non-oil traded goods sector (Tsalik, 2003,
pp. 1–12, 89–119, 127–167)
Modernization effect ¼ culture does not change, because
economic system does not lead to the rise of communications
and rise of occupational specializations (Ross, 2001, p. 337).
5 Often, these networks are called clans (please see (Schatz, 2004) or
(Collins, 2006)), which I object to, because they are not based on ethnic,
religious or cultural afﬁliation. Rather, they are based on the patrimonialThe assumptions that inform resource curse come from
the formal economicmodel calledHeckscher-Ohlin theorem.
It argues that aneconomywill tendtoberelativelyeffective at
producing goods that are intensive in factors with which the
country is relatively well endowed (Obstfeld and Krugman,
2006, p. 61). In other words, existence of minerals in
Kazakhstan and cotton and gas in Uzbekistan create biased
growth due to high proﬁts, rents, governments get from
simply extracting and shipping commodities abroad.
Economic effects of biased growth, also called Dutch Disease,
and dependence on rents creates movement of the factors of
productionwhere labor, capital and land resources shift from
other industries to themost proﬁtable industrial sectors, like
oil, gas and mineral extraction. As a result, the non-tradable4 It is important to note that rent can occur not only from extraction of
natural resources, but also frommanagerial innovations, geopolitical rent,
that includes aid and other forms of economic assistance, and contrived
rent understood as excess revenue from the required effective public
spending (Auty, 2006d, p. 4).goods sector loses capital, land and labor resources. For
a country that derives its wealth from the minerals, biased
growth is also coupled with the spending effect, when rent
revenue goes abroad as payment for imports rather than
invested domestically, non-energy sectors lose positive
externalitiesputtingdomesticproducersatadisadvantage. In
other words, as economic actors gain extra money to spend,
they tend tobuycheaper imports rather thanproducing them
domestically. Factor movement and spending effects make
population more dependent on the successful industries for
livelihoods and prevent revenue gain from non-rent sectors.
Dutch Disease creates the following political implica-
tions: ﬁrst, by redistributing rents along the patronage or
bureaucratic system both regimes prevent formation of
opposition groups making people dependent on state
regulation.5 High revenues also allow states not to impose
heavy taxes and become less accountable to its people.
Lastly, high economic rents make political positions highly
lucrative sending incentives to invest in police in order to
repress opposition and remain in power (Ross, 2001, p.
335). Lastly, societies in such states remain undemocratic
because dependence on government salaries or on incomes
from large corporations precludes people from acquiring
occupational specializations making them complacent and
politically inactive (Ross, 2001, p. 337).Resourcecurse theoristsargue thatUzbekistan’sagricultural
rents are fundamentally different from the mineral rents of
Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan’s cotton, its primary export
commodity6 brings smaller rents due to the need for redistri-
bution of wealth among many actors involved in cotton
production. Cotton requires centralized control or existence of
large corporations in order to make it proﬁtable enough to
invest in irrigation infrastructure, provisionof other inputs and
marketing network (Pomfret, 2006, p. 81).Withwater scarcityrelation to leadership with the following characteristics: a) bureaucratic
recruitment is based on personal conﬁdence with ruler seeking various
guarantees of indivisibility of his power; b) social policy aimed at
ensuring the benevolence of the masses; c) wealth and social inﬂuence
concentrated in the hands of the small group of people who have access
to commercial circuits (adopted from, Sarfatti, 1966, pp. 8–52).
6 Gold is next, but the value of it remains secret. Please see (Pomfret,
2006, p. 78).
Chart 1. Comparison of the industrial output in Kazakhstan in the 1990 and 2005. Source: (National Statistical Agency of Kazakhstan, 2006, p. 124).
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centralized control is preferred because it minimizes the risks
of volatility in price and consumer demand. Government
appropriates most of rent as government revenue accrued
through the state trading of cotton exports and state order
system in agriculture (Esanov et al., 2006, p. 46). Development
of market economy in Uzbekistan is difﬁcult because of the
nature of cotton production that requires strong state
involvement in economic activities. At the same time,
democracy isdifﬁcult toachievewithcitizensbeingdependent
on state salaries with half public expenses diverted into agri-
culture and irrigation (Unit, 2006, p. 8). In addition,Uzbekistan
spends almost twice the average on education, health and
social services (Esanov et al., 2006, p. 45; Unit, 2006).
Oil andmineral commodity exports created high resource
rents in Kazakhstan, understood as pure proﬁts generated by
the extraction of natural resources (Esanov et al., 2006, p. 39).
Rents allowedelites to remain inpower (Esanovetal., 2006,p.
40) by redistributing resources through patronage networks,
maintenance of low taxes and co-optation of opposition.
However, due to the fact that half of the rent accrues by
private investors as a return to the services they provide,
makes Kazakhstani economy dualistic in nature. Capital-
intensive industries that employ few workers provide high
revenue, whereas labor-intensive industries oriented
towards domestic demand like agriculture are lacking
investments (Auty, 2006b, p. 68). This dualism increases gaps
between workers in capital vs. labor-intensive sectors
producing factor-movement effect and brain-drain. As
a result, Kazakhstan loses manufacturing capacity due to the
lack of positive externalities developing Dutch Disease. In
order to regulate dualism that also creates a divide between
rural and urban areas and between ethnic groups (Auty,
2006b, p. 69), government expanded bureaucracy7 and7 Speciﬁcally, new government bodies were established like the
Development Bank of Kazakhstan formed in 2001 with 100% state
participation, Investment Fund created in 2003 under 100% control by the
Government, National Innovation Fund formed in 2003 also with 100%
government funding. Also, most of the government shares in the joint
ventures or production sharing agreements are operated by the national
company Samruk-Kazyna that represents state interests in those projects.
For more please see (Sultanov, 2005, pp. 67–78).provided incentives for the development of medium and
small businesses. Legitimacy is based on the premise that the
state will not interfere into economic activities so long as
everyone pays the dues. The hands-off approach to society
prevents establishment of the democratic processes because
change of leadership might negatively affect mechanisms of
personal enrichment (Chart 1).
In addition, democracy in Kazakhstan is difﬁcult to ach-
ieve because the state establishes patronage system of
rent extraction that links government and businesses into
a single political system,which is likely tonurture predatory
government that distorts economy and prevents economic
growth (Auty, 2006a, p. 274, Tsalik, 2003).
Although sources of rents are fundamentally different in
Kazakhstan andUzbekistan total rent aspercentage ofGDP in
2000was high for both states: Kazakhstan 27.2% fromoil and
1.5% from gas and Uzbekistan 17.8% from gas and 15.6% from
oil (Esanov et al., 2006, p. 43). In addition, revenue for both
economies is very much dependent on the external demand
and ability to export, which produces the outward-looking
and long-termpolitical and economic reform strategies,with
inward-looking patronage-dispensing agenda of central
regional and local governments (AutyandDeSoysa, 2006, pp.
148–149). In the political realm both regimes retain legiti-
macy by creating wealth in order to sustain GDP growth that
is partially redistributed to people. The beneﬁts of the story
provided by the RC are embedded in the explanation of how
economic structure precludes political reforms by sending
incentives for the authoritarian political regimes that derive
legitimacy from controlling sources of personal livelihoods
for the majority of people. RC outlines the general system of
incentives that regulate both economic and political realms,
however, it is not detailed enough to explain the process and
outcomes of state regulation. I will supplement this story by
the second framework for the analysis of Central Asia called
Varieties of Capitalism.4. Model 2 varieties of capitalism
VoC treats political economy as production regimes
where ﬁrms’ behavior is determined by government
regulation and overall institutional setting (Hollingsworth
and Boyer, 1997; Soskice, 1999). It argues that depending
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advance, develop or forfeit technological innovations, and
provide long or short-term employment of the population
(Soskice, 1999). Hence, regulation becomes an important
component of growth and includes both the behavior of
those in power and the wider participation of citizens and
representative organizations (Lane, 2006, p. 8). Institutions
evolve through historical decisions that states adopt
towards governance, that constitute peculiarities of the
production regime in each country. The term institutional
comparative advantage reﬂects instruments of regulation
(market or non-market) and incentives sent to the private
actors shifting economy to the virtuous (market-based
capitalist system of production) or the vicious circles of
growth (predatory system of capitalist production) (Coates,
2005, p. 17).
In this perspective political regime does not matter per
se. The assumption is that authoritarian states can be
productive if they act as developmental states (virtuous
circle), but can become impediments if their interference
into economy makes economic activities unproﬁtable
whether due to high taxes and corrupt bureaucracies or
due to the absence of law, order, contract enforcement and
provision of public goods (vicious circle). The crucial
question for the regime is its ability to limit and re-organize
itself into an economic actor. VoC scholars believe that the
goal of building capitalism could never be achieved based
on the models and step-by-step approach. Instead, they
argued that besides regular economic factors of production
and endowments, local institutions play important role in
the pace and quality of economic transition.
VoC scholars deﬁne ﬁrms relationally, as ‘actors seeking
to develop and exploit capacities for producing, developing
and distributing goods and services proﬁtably’ (Hall and
Soskice, 2001, p. 6). Proﬁtability would depend on the
three criteria:8 This state body unites 404 various companies under one government
umbrella endowed with the economic stabilization functions and support
of the industrial-innovative projects. Please see www.samruk-kazyna.
kzfor more information.a) industrial relations understood as relations between
ﬁrms aimed at coordinating bargaining over wages and
working conditions with their labor force;
b) corporate governance deﬁned as a realm of ﬁnancing
operations to which ﬁrms turn for access to ﬁnance and
in which investors seek assurances of returns on their
investments; and
c) inter-ﬁrm relations – relationships a company forms
with other enterprises, notably with suppliers and
clients (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 7).
These arrangements reﬂect institutions - a set of rules,
formal or informal, that actors generally follow (Hall and
Soskice, 2001, p. 9) which provide ﬁrms with advantages
for engaging in speciﬁc types of activities to produce goods
more efﬁciently than others depending on high or low
transaction costs. Under such setting, authoritarian insti-
tutional conﬁguration could launch a virtuous circle by
encouraging ﬁrms to develop proﬁtable industries or
vicious circle when forms become reliant on government’s
support and its subsidies. The dynamic of government
regulation towards virtuous circle or away from it is path-
dependent and historically evolves over time.Two Central Asian states make the case for the analysis
of regulation especially interesting. Industrial relations in
both states are characterized by the existence of large
successful enterprises, which developed not because of the
market mechanisms, but because of the close relations to
State in a form of a patronage network. However, despite
similar political set up, ﬁrms’ relations with the state differ
in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan because of the different
transition patterns both governments adopted at the
beginning of the 1990s. Uzbekistan adhered to the ‘gradual
path’ of reforms retaining state control over majority of
industries, whereas Kazakhstan embraced ‘shock therapy’
model of rapid transition to market economy.
Kazakhstan’s ‘shock therapy’ model based on privatiza-
tion, decentralization and liberalization allowed ﬁrms to
establish clusters of industries via market incentives. Some
ﬁrms invited foreign investors, others tapped into ﬁnancial
markets in order to developdomestically-oriented industries
and services. Cash source determined two types of institu-
tional arrangements in Kazakhstan’s capitalist system. First,
ﬁrms that acquired Foreign Direct Investments were inter-
ested in maintaining their good standing with the govern-
ment and thereforeprovided support throughsocial projects,
sale of shares to the government, and payment of taxes. In
return, state invited foreign direct investments to develop
large domestic enterprises by giving them preferential
treatments, tax cuts and lax labor protection laws (Peck,
2004). Under such conditions, ﬁrms do not have strong
incentives to concede to labor, because it is not organized and
does not have a strong legal basis making labor relations in
FSUmore liberal and market-regulated than in the US (Knell
and Shorlec, 2007, pp. 46–48). Inter-ﬁrm relations are polit-
icallymotivated and not based onmarket instruments per se,
because government owns shares in most of the enterprises
and they are managed by a single government entity called
Samruk-Kazyna.8 This state body coordinates economic
activities of ﬁrms that supply the majority revenue of the
budget by shufﬂing proﬁts from one entity into another,
acquiring shares and stocks (Ernst and Young, 2008, pp. 280,
326). Large domestic ﬁrms with the FDI presence are in an
interesting predicament: they have to be proﬁtable to retain
international competitiveness and at the same time they
have to share proﬁts with the government.
On the other hand, SMEs are mostly private. Only 1% of
them are state-owned (Surveys, 2009a, p. 5). They thrive
because of the relatively easy registration (1–30 days to
obtain import licence), availability of credit and banking
loans under a 90% collateral (compared with 100% and
120% in upper-middle income countries and Eastern
Europe respectively) (Surveys, 2009, p. 8). In addition, SMEs
thrive because government does not dependent on tax
revenue from the broad social base per se. Capital avail-
ability determines development of the alternative
economic sectors for ﬁrms outside of ‘national signiﬁcance’.
Corporate governance is widely used in Kazakhstan,
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industries. So far there are two types of ﬁrms operating in
the market: a) large enterprises with high share of FDI that
are not looking for ﬁnancing in corporate governance
structures due to engagement in mineral extraction; b)
alternative industries, including SMEs, like food industry,
construction and ﬁnancial sector that are able to raise
capital abroad and operate outside of state control.
Kazakhstan’s economic system has no incentives for
democratization. Large corporations with the presence of
FDI are interested in the stability and preservations of their
contracts and maintenance of status-quo. Nazarbaev’s
regime serves the aspirations for stability and more or less
respects of contracts. SMEs also support the regime
because they have freedom to manoeuvre as long as they
remain local and/or regional. Inability to develop large
projects outside of government control created opposition
movements staffed with successful businessmen appealing
to the need for democracy with little public support. Under
such conditions, VoC specialists see little chance for
democracy in Kazakhstan (Gleason, 2003; Lane, 2006).
Uzbekistan, a country where regime implemented
‘gradual’ state-led transition retaining centralized control
over economy with welfare support of the majority of
population. Currently, Uzbekistan spends 54% of the annual
budget on social sphere (News Agency, January 2009).
Firms, themajor actors in VoC paradigm, have no incentives
to develop market mechanisms and instead await regula-
tion from the state. With the majority of population
engaged in agriculture (close to 35%) (Gleason, 2003, p.
120), such institutional structure prevents Uzbekistani
economy from fostering backward and forward linkages. In
other words, ﬁrms that rely on government support are not
interested in nurturing relations with their suppliers
(backward linkage) and consumers (forward linkage). Lack
of incentives among ﬁrms to create internationally
competitive goods is the second outcome of centralized
institutional arrangement. As a result, present economic
clusters are unable to exist outside of state support.
In Uzbekistan ﬁnancing is provided by the state
(Surveys, Uzbekistan: Country Proﬁle 2009b), because of
the underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets in the country. Less
than 15% of ﬁrms in the country have access to loans from
the banks (Surveys, Uzbekistan: Country Proﬁle 2009b).
Ninety two percent of the domestic ﬁrms are funded by the
domestic sources (Surveys, Uzbekistan: Country Proﬁle
2009b, p. 3). Absence of funds and credit agencies outside
of government institutions further exacerbates the devel-
opment of alternative capital-intensive industries, like
ﬁnancial, technological services forcing ﬁrms to remain
small on average employing 24 people with 50% of the
ﬁrms having 10 or fewer employees (Surveys, Uzbekistan:
Country Proﬁle 2009b, p. 2). SMEs are usually registered
as sole proprietorships uninterested in providing services
of international quality. Uzbek government is the full or
majority shareholder in half of all SMEs which account for
most employment in the sector (Surveys, Uzbekistan:
Country Proﬁle 2009b). At the same time Uzbek SMEs
suffer from high taxes that beneﬁt local farms and state-
owned enterprises. SMEs remain small to avoid predatory
state practices (Auty and De Soysa, 2006, p. 141). Only 1% ofﬁrms have international certiﬁcate (Surveys, Uzbekistan:
Country Proﬁle 2009b, p. 4) compared to 11% in
Kazakhstan (Surveys, Kazakhstan: Country Proﬁle 2009a, p.
12). Most of them are oriented at the domestic market,
which is reﬂected in numbers: only 2% of ﬁrms export
abroad (Surveys, Uzbekistan: Country Proﬁle 2009b, p. 3).
Domestic orientation also prevents ﬁrms from acquiring
technological innovations and communications. Only 7% of
ﬁrms maintain a website (Surveys, Uzbekistan: Country
Proﬁle 2009b, p. 4). Fifty six percent of ﬁrms admitted
that bribes are necessary to do business in Uzbekistan
(Surveys, Uzbekistan: Country Proﬁle 2009b, p. 4) keeping
the size of the ﬁrms low in order to survive.
Under these conditions, democracy becomes difﬁcult to
sustain since people are interested in stability of the state
being largely dependent on its salaries and subsidies. Single
leader who provides for the people represents a convenient
choice for the overall population. Opposition movement in
Uzbekistan is largelyexiledorexistsas a sporadic forceagainst
severely corrupt government ofﬁcials (Rustemova, in press).
VoC theory states that authoritarian regimes prevent
establishment of free markets but set reasonably well with
low level of labor protection and freedom for smaller
businesses (Coates, 2005, pp. 15–16; Lane, 2006, p. 8). It
also points to the outcomes of path-dependency of the
historic decisions about the nature of transition adopted by
both leaders. Kazakhstan adopted a ‘shock therapy’ tran-
sition that led to the development of the private sector and
ﬂow of foreign direct investments into economy making
large corporations satisﬁed with the authoritarian leader
due to the provision of stability of economic operations in
Kazakhstan. On the other hand, independent corporations
that do not rely on government for revenue are unsatisﬁed
with authoritarianism seeking the rule of law and trans-
parency. Uzbekistan on the other hand, chose gradual
approach and state control of transition. State has control
over liberalisation pace and decentralizing mechanisms
thereby effectively precluding ﬁrms to have incentives to
innovate or develop comparative advantages. State support
and protectionism allows ﬁrms to ﬂourish in the domestic
market. Democracy in such economic system is difﬁcult to
sustain because the majority of people are dependent on
government salaries, ﬁnances and support.
Both theories make illuminating conclusions about the
nature of political and economic systems in Central Asia.
They claim that:
a) Political economy of Central Asia cannot be analyzed by
pure economic modeling and a priori prescriptions
because politics and economics are woven together not
only in an ordinary interdependent fashion seen in
most developed states, but represented by a highly
structured personalist political regime that pursues
economic liberalization in two different ways.
b) Economic structure matters and determines political
conditions in both states making these differences
crucial for the explanatory paradigm.
However, each paradigm has own limitations. RC story
theorizes economy through an interest-based perspective
but is inattentive to the new practices of governing. RC also
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erate even under conﬂicting and incompatible interests.
Whereas VoC story very much centers on the outcomes of
the practices and regulation of each state, but does not
theorize the economy behind these practices. In addition,
both theories fail to examine the gap between regulation
and its implementation in practice when the policies are
aborted or altered.5. Model 3 governmentality
Governmentality promises to alleviate these difﬁculties
without negating the value of both theories. At the begin-
ning of the article I deﬁned governmentality as an ethos
aimed to rationalize reality in order to reach the Telos, and
as an internal logic that guides government’s regulation.9
I distinguished two types of governmentality: managerial
rationale in Kazakhstan and paternalistic rationale in
Uzbekistan, which aspire to become democratic and capi-
talist countries via ‘authoritarian paradox’, i.e. creating
democracy and capitalism by the authoritarian means and
strong state regulation. By conceptualizing government
regulation as rationales, we are able to peak into the
following problematique:
1. To compare the type of problems important and worth
government intervention that go beyond economic and
political divide.
2. To compare themethods and techniques that authorities
use in order to solve these problems.
Two discursive functions show the problems that the
state considers important and also inform the techniques it
uses to solve them: coordinative discourse calls state
bodies and ofﬁces to share and pledge allegiance to the
telos during practical implementation of policy. On the
other hand, it has to be communicated to the public framed
and justiﬁed in a continuous fashion. Division of the gov-
ernmentality into coordinative and communicative func-
tions allow for policy change in the particulars with Meta
discourse or telos remaining the same. As a result, an all-
intervening paternalist state will rely on the instruments of
oppression, such as law and police force. Managerial state
will use a set of positive and negative incentives to govern
its population and will employ cost-beneﬁt analysis to
solve problems. Managerial rationale does not require
eradication of problems per se, but aims only to avoid
growth of problems that could challenge existing economic
system. Paternalistic rationale is omnipresent and9 Foucault himself gives fairly ambiguous deﬁnition of gov-
ernmentality: Foucault gives three meanings to the term gov-
ernmentality. First, he identiﬁes the shift in the style of governance from
the sovereign state of justice with subordinate subjects into states as
administrative entities. This transition was accompanied with the
development of a series of speciﬁc governmental apparatuses and
a certain body of knowledge, which Foucault also identiﬁes as gov-
ernmentality. Finally, by “governmentality” he understands the result of
the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the
administrative state in the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries and was
gradually “governmentalised” (Foucault, 2007, pp. 131–139).perceives all problems worth looking into regardless of
their scope and fashion.
As a result, democracy is difﬁcult not only because of
rents and policies of economic development, but also
because of the technologies of power used in two states.
Paternalistic rationale of Uzbekistan dresses political deci-
sions in highly moral clothes.10 Communicative function of
governmentality fostersdepictionof the state as a father, the
owner, the provider of the population. In such conditions,
Uzbekistan turns the political into a binary stand of ‘either
with us or against us’. By doing so, it a priori circumscribes
the limits of discussion on what is permissible. The state’s
takeover of the moral realm precludes citizens’ disagree-
ment, contestation, or effective participation in the political
setting. As a result, Uzbekistan’s government propagates the
idea of a malleable and obedient citizenry that complies
with the state’s regulations and decisions. Instead, as an
example of the coordinative logic, political regime propa-
gates its own version of democracy based on the social
equality forcing bureaucratic bodies to spend many
resources on welfare. Western democracy is said to be
unable to cope with social inequality, which breeds social
instability, poverty and the lumpenization of the population
(Karimov, 1998, p. 129).11 Paternalistic state helps people
‘adjust’ to market conditions by interfering and regulating
major aspects of social life (Rustemova, in print).12 Those
who challenge the state not only question the leader, but
also question the whole morality of the enterprise.
Kazakhstan’s communicative discourse promotes
notion of the political as an economic enterprise where
government acts a manager in the existing system of
exchange. However, the managerial position also alters the
nature of the political away from contestation and struggle,
because the government claims to possess technical
expertise and, therefore, treats genuinely political issues as
technical and speciﬁc (Rustemova, in print). Coordinative
discourse forces state bodies to support individual freedom
of self-enrichment within the structures and conditions set
up by the state. Repression takes a form of penalties, ﬁnes,
criminal proceedings against opposition members that
challenge technocratic bureaucracy in Kazakhstan, because
they portray themselves as more knowledgeable and savvy
than the people in power.
Authoritarianism is further entrenched through
showing the success of governing rationales: how the
problems posed were successfully solved by the techniques
chosen. Kazakhstan’s technocratic, self-limiting rationale
calls for the goal-oriented programs with clear a priori set
benchmarks. Its speciﬁc programs are written from the
perspective of the cost-beneﬁt analysis of a speciﬁc
problem and manipulation of the positive and negative
incentives. Therefore, progress is evaluated through the
growth of abstract economic indicators like GDP, compet-
itiveness rankings and trade turnover. Failure in managerial10 I have made similar arguments in Adams and Rustemova 2009.
11 I am thankful to Dr. Fischer who introduced work of Vivienne
Schmidt to me. I am borrowing and modifying her terms of discourse
theory developed for the democratic states in Western Europe.
12 Please see (Rustemova, in press).
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In the paternalistic rationale progress is evaluated through
the careful outline of the increasing individual well-being.
Uzbekistan’s paternalistic rationale perceives its role as an
ultimate moral authority. Its primary tactics of governing
towards progress are evaluated through the morally fair
political campaigns with no clear benchmarks and only
a posteriori report of the results. Instead of social problems,
they pick social communities and tend to address all of
their issues in a single annual political campaign. Failure is
attributed to the speciﬁc government ofﬁcials who are
deemed immoral individuals undermining overall social
progress. We notice two tactical differences of how prog-
ress and success of each rationale is portrayed and man-
ifested through the prism of the political economy.
Although governmentality discourse requires a separate
research, it allows for multiple reforms with contradictory
goals to co-exist under the auspices of managerial or
paternalistic styles of governing. It fosters theorization of
the economy as a constant shift and change of regulation
followed by the supporting discursive practices. It does not
mean that two styles of governmentality are mutually
exclusive; on the contrary, they co-exist in two states.
However, the differences are especially pronounced in
economic development and political realms.6. Conclusion
Pure economic theories are incapable of analyzing
economic growth and capitalist development together
with political implications. Two theories provided an
interesting perspective on how economic structures
precluded democratizing incentives for the political
regimes in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. I argued that Fou-
cault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ provides a coherent
explanation of the entrenched authoritarianism in two
Central Asian regimes. Echoing ﬁndings of the RC and VoC
paradigms, economic structure created impediments for
democracy in Central Asia. Kazakhstan that adopted ‘shock
therapy’ path towards liberal market economy, perceives
itself as amanager of the population. Its economic structure
is based on resource extraction of rents that are redis-
tributed through patronage networks. Authoritarian dura-
bility of the regime stems from the support of the large
ﬁnancial-industrial groups and ability to accrue wealth by
the private actors unafﬁliated with the state. In Uzbekistan,
the situation is different. ‘Gradual’ way of reforms put
Uzbek state into dominant paternalistic position. High
concentration of enterprises in government’s hands
precludes development of SMEs and retains large portions
of labor force dependent on state support. As a result, the
regime in Uzbekistan functions as a redistribution mecha-
nism providing salaries to the majority of population. In
addition, persistence of rural population engaged in cotton
production decreases uncertainty over revenues when the
state provides subsidies and support regardless of inter-
national commodity prices and/or labor productivity.
Under such conditions, democratization, i.e change of
leadership, threatens the beneﬁts of people within
government hierarchies and those dependent on it.However, these views seemed incomplete without
discursive practices that followed economic regulation. M.
Foucault’s idea of governmentality, the ethos with which
government approaches regulation informs not only the
way economic reforms communicated to the population,
but also the way they are coordinated through the
bureaucracy, which requires additional research. It also
explains the nature of the political realm that government
wants to achieve where democracy is restricted not only by
the economic structure, but also by the discursive strate-
gies that point to the economic success of the authoritarian
regimes in exchange for authoritarian durability. This
article claimed that the governmentality framework would
not have been valid without economic background and
examination of politics because in countries where
economic development is the sole legitimating principle
for both regimes, economy becomes more important but
also highly politicized. The path to the economic liber-
alization is crucial not only for the authoritarian durability
of the ruler, but also to the overall economic and political
nature in both states.References
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